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How do people acquire knowledge about the world? Do the
sources of information that underlie knowledge acquisition in
young children differ from those in adults? These fundamental
questions have permeated scientific inquiry since the time of
Socrates and Aristotle.
Following in this tradition, a recent article by Sloutsky, Kloos,
and Fisher (SKF; 2007) is ambitious—indeed, classic. Their
goal was to uncover the contributions of conceptual and per-
ceptual information in children’s categorization and induction
about natural kinds. But experimental evidence is only as good
as the theory and logic upon which it rests. Unfortunately, SKF’s
approach to each of the key constructs—concepts, perceptual
information, categorization, and induction—misses its mark.
To quickly review: SKF taught children two novel categories
of buglike entities, stipulating that the categories could be
distinguished by the ratio of buttons to fingers (members of one
category had more buttons than fingers, members of the other
had more fingers than buttons). SKF introduced novel words
(ziblet and flurp) for these categories. Children successfully
extended these names to new instances. SKF then told children
that one particular individual had a certain property (e.g., ‘‘thick
blood’’). The children extended that property to items of the
same overall appearance, ignoring the ziblet/flurp distinction.
SKF interpreted this result as showing that ‘‘looks are every-
thing’’ in children’s inductive inferences.
We illustrate our concerns with an analogy. Suppose we aim
to study the role of conceptual versus perceptual similarity in
reasoning about natural kinds. We teach children two novel
categories, stipulating that they are evensies (dogs with an even
number of whiskers) and oddsies (dogs with an odd number of
whiskers). We find that children learn these words without dif-
ficulty. We then tell the children that one particular dog (e.g., a
collie evensy) has a certain kind of blood inside. We find that
they extend that property on the basis of appearance, general-
izing to perceptually similar dogs, disregarding the evensy/
oddsy distinction (e.g., they extend the property to a collie oddsy,
but not a Chihuahua evensy).
From this evidence, can we conclude that children use per-
ceptual similarity rather than natural-kind membership in their
inductive inferences? We think not. The experiment lacks con-
struct validity. The novel categories created for this experiment
are not natural kinds, and naming them (evensy or oddsy) does
not make them so. The appearance of the items is a better guide
to natural-kind membership than are the labels. Our concerns
about this hypothetical example apply equally to SKF’s study.
ARE THESE NATURAL KINDS?
Although the individual instances SKF used were patterned
after living things (bugs), the novel categories (ziblets and flurps)
are not natural kinds. Mill (1843) proposed a continuum, with
inductively rich groupings (described as natural kinds) at one
end and arbitrary groupings that capture just a single property
(e.g., ‘‘white things’’) at the other. We acknowledge that there is
little consensus regarding where precisely one might draw the
line between natural and arbitrary categories. There is also se-
rious debate concerning whether natural kinds exist in the world
or are wholly a product of human cognition (Schwartz, 1977). We
do not seek to address this metaphysical concern here. Instead,
we assume that natural kinds have a psychological reality:
People intuitively attribute more inductive depth to these cat-
egories than to arbitrary categories (Medin & Ortony, 1989).
From our perspective, SKF’s ziblets and flurps are arbitrary
categories. They differ in appearance by only one property:
fingers-to-buttons ratio. We know of no account that defines a
natural kind by a single ratio (Murphy, 2002), let alone the ratio
between the numbers of a body part and a clothing accessory.
This seems to us a profoundly arbitrary property. It is important
to consider that for children and adults, properties that are
arbitrary, accidental, or temporary do not generalize to other
instances of a kind and are not predictive of stable, functionally
relevant biological properties (Gelman, 1988; Waxman, Lynch,
Casey, & Baer, 1997). If the goal is to test children’s reasoning
about natural kinds—or any category with strong inductive
potential—SKF’s categories fall short.
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ARE THESE BASIC-LEVEL CATEGORIES?
Whether or not SKF’s categories are natural kinds, might they
have inductive potential? Basic-level categories stand out for
their inductive potential (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, &
Boyes-Braem, 1976). When a novel property is attributed to
an individual (a collie), children and adults tend to extend this
property broadly within the same basic-level category (dogs).
Without explicit evidence to the contrary, they do not restrict
their extensions within subordinate-level boundaries (collies;
Waxman et al., 1997). Because ziblets and flurps were designed
as subordinate-level categories (i.e., types of bugs), children’s
tendency to extend SKF’s novel property beyond the ziblet-flurp
boundary is not surprising; their extension of this property to
both kinds of bugs is likely to have been conceptually, as well as
perceptually, motivated.
DOES NAMING CREATE NATURAL KINDS?
We also dispute SKF’s assumptions about naming. Naming an
arbitrarily defined category cannot transform it into the induc-
tively rich kind of category that SKF purported to study (Da-
vidson & Gelman, 1990). Even novice word learners appreciate
that count nouns refer not only to basic-level natural kinds
(‘‘dog’’), but also to subordinate-level categories (‘‘collie’’), re-
lational groupings (‘‘pet’’), situation-restricted categories
(‘‘passenger’’), and so on. Only some of these categories support
strong inductive inferences (Hall, 1993; Mandler, 2004; Mark-
man, 1989; Waxman, 1990).
What, then, was the basis of children’s inferences in SKF’s
experiments? SKF claimed to have placed perceptual informa-
tion in direct conflict with kind information, but this alleged
conflict could have arisen only if the children interpreted the
labels as referring to kinds. We have offered several reasons to
suspect that ziblet and flurp were unlikely to have been so in-
terpreted. Consequently, appearance was likely the best clue
to kind membership in this task (Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003;
Gelman & Medin, 1993; Gopnik & Nazzi, 2003). This does not
mean that appearances constitute membership for natural kinds,
any more than gray hair and wrinkles constitute membership
in the category ‘‘grandmother’’ (Armstrong, Gleitman, & Gleitman,
1983).
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Rebecca Gómez, Nora Newcombe, and Vladimir Sloutsky for
insightful reviews.
REFERENCES
Armstrong, S.L., Gleitman, L.R., & Gleitman, H.G. (1983). On what
some concepts might not be. Cognition, 13, 263–308.
Davidson, N.S., & Gelman, S.A. (1990). Inductions from novel cate-
gories: The role of language and conceptual structure. Cognitive
Development, 5, 151–176.
Diesendruck, G., & Bloom, P. (2003). How specific is the shape bias?
Child Development, 74, 168–178.
Gelman, S.A. (1988). The development of induction within natural
kind and artifact categories. Cognitive Psychology, 20, 65–96.
Gelman, S.A., & Medin, D.L. (1993). What’s so essential about
essentialism? A different perspective on the interaction of
perception, language, and conceptual knowledge. Cognitive
Development, 8, 157–167.
Gopnik, A., & Nazzi, T. (2003). Word, kinds and causal powers: A
theory theory perspective on early naming and categorization. In
D.H. Rakison & L.M. Oakes (Eds.), Early category and concept
development: Making sense of the blooming, buzzing confusion
(pp. 303–329). New York: Oxford University Press.
Hall, D.G. (1993). Basic-level individuals. Cognition, 48, 199–221.
Mandler, J.M. (2004). The foundations of mind: Origins of conceptual
thought. New York: Oxford University Press.
Markman, E.M. (1989). Categorization and naming in children:
Problems in induction. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Book/MIT
Press.
Medin, D.L., & Ortony, A. (1989). Psychological essentialism. In
S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.), Similarity and analogical
reasoning (pp. 179–195). Cambridge, England: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Mill, J.S. (1843). A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive. London:
Longmans.
Murphy, G.L. (2002). The big book of concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Rosch, E., Mervis, C.B., Gray, W.D., Johnson, D.M., & Boyes-Braem, P.
(1976). Basic objects in natural categories. Cognitive Psychology,
8, 382–439.
Schwartz, S.P. (Ed.). (1977). Naming, necessity, and natural kinds.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Sloutsky, V.M., Kloos, H., & Fisher, A.V. (2007). When looks are ev-
erything: Appearance similarity versus kind information in early
induction. Psychological Science, 18, 179–185.
Waxman, S.R. (1990). Linguistic biases and the establishment of
conceptual hierarchies: Evidence from preschool children. Cog-
nitive Development, 5, 123–150.
Waxman, S.R., Lynch, E.B., Casey, K.L., & Baer, L. (1997). Setters and
samoyeds: The emergence of subordinate level categories as a
basis for inductive inference. Developmental Psychology, 33,
1074–1090.
(RECEIVED 9/20/06; REVISION ACCEPTED 10/27/06;
FINAL MATERIALS RECEIVED 11/1/06)
Volume 18—Number 6 555
Susan A. Gelman and Sandra R. Waxman
